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Interrogating the Unknown: 
Risk Analysis and Sensemaking in Airline Safety Oversight 
 
Carl Macrae1 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The initial identification of risks in organizations is one of the key challenges of 
risk management. This research investigates how weak signals of emerging risks 
are identified and interpreted within airlines. An ethnographic study of airline flight 
safety investigators was conducted to examine the interpretive work of risk analysis 
and the sensemaking processes employed to identify risks. The findings suggest 
that the perception and use of organizational ignorance was central to this work. 
Risks were identified by constructing and enlarging small moments of doubt, where 
current knowledge was found to be questionable or suspect in some way. These 
sensemaking processes were supported by an analytical culture organized around 
assumptions that organizational knowledge is inherently limited, partial and fallible.  
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Introduction  
 
One of the key challenges facing risk managers in organizations is the identification 
of previously unknown threats. Organizations deploy risk management systems to 
catalogue, analyze and control threats to their operations. But in modern, complex 
and hazardous organizations such as airlines, risks are rarely self-evident. They 
must be actively identified and interpreted, often in a context rich with weak or 
equivocal signs of potential problems. And many of the most serious and 
challenging risks typically lie at—or just beyond—the limits of current knowledge. 
Analyses of major organizational accidents, such as the loss of the space shuttle 
Challenger (Vaughan, 1996), have revealed how catastrophic organizational 
breakdowns can result from longstanding issues that were not noticed, recognized 
or understood as serious risks within the organization before the event (Turner, 
1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). It is these unknown, hidden and latent risks that 
can pose the most insidious threat to organizations (Reason, 1997).  
 
In practice, identifying new and previously unknown risks depends on the 
professional judgment and expertise of risk managers. Risk managers must interpret 
information on organizational performance to identify and piece together signs that 
some previously unknown risk exists—such as a serious procedural flaw, for 
instance. This work involves an ongoing process of monitoring for previously 
unexpected and unforeseen risks. Reason (1990, 1997) has argued that unknown, 
latent risks are inevitable in all organizations and the primary purpose of risk 
analysis is to find them and “make them visible” (Reason, 1997, p. 37). Wildavsky 
(1988, p. 93) argues that scanning, probing and “interrogating the unknown” lies at 
the heart of risk management. However, these initial processes of risk identification 
are largely ignored in current risk analysis methods. Risk analysis tools typically 
focus on the measurement and comparison of risks, implying that their initial 
identification is largely unproblematic (e.g. Cabinet Office, 2002; Institute of Risk 
Management, 2002). Further, the initial identification of risks in organizations has 
received little empirical attention. This is perhaps unsurprising. The initial 
identification of a risk represents the earliest and most tentative stage of risk 
management (Hutter and Power, 2005). It depends on processes of interpretation 
that are heavily shaped by both individual knowledge and organizational culture. 
These interpretive processes are hard to see.  
 
Yet what is interpreted and labeled as a risk at this early stage determines which 
issues receive further scrutiny, analysis and management—and which do not. It is at 
this early, tentative stage of risk analysis that consequential judgments are made 
regarding what to attend to, what to ignore, what to question, and what to take for 
granted (Weick, 1998a). Understanding the nature of this early interpretive work in 
risk analysis is therefore crucial to understanding broader issues of risk 
management in organizations.  
 
The concept of organizational ‘sensemaking’ (Weick, 1979; 1995) provides a useful 
theoretical lens through which to examine the early interpretive processes of risk 
analysis. Sensemaking refers to the processes that people engage in to understand 
ambiguous situations, interpret uncertain or anomalous data, and literally make 
sense of confusing events that confront them. Processes of sensemaking unfold 
when people actively notice and select cues in a situation and relate them to broader 
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frames of reference in order to create a plausible, meaningful and useful account 
that can guide and explain action. The failure of sensemaking is strongly implicated 
in many studies of organizational accidents and disaster (e.g. Turner, 1976; Weick, 
1993; Snook, 2000). As such, organizational sensemaking offers a valuable set of 
ideas that are well-suited to studying the early processes of noticing, identifying and 
interpreting signs of unknown, latent risks in organizations.  
 
The present research examined the sensemaking processes through which latent 
risks are identified and interpreted in organizations, and the cultural premises and 
characteristics that support this activity. It specifically studied how operational risks 
to flight safety are identified in airlines, drawing on a qualitative, ethnographic 
study of flight safety investigators. The core work of these investigators was the 
analysis of minor operational errors and failures as a means of overseeing 
organizational safety and identifying new, previously unrecognized risks.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. First, the work of airline safety incident analysis 
is detailed. It is argued that this setting presents an ideal site to study processes of 
sensemaking in risk analysis and particularly the identification of latent risks. 
Second, theories of organizational risk and sensemaking are reviewed and 
connections between them developed. Next, the research approach and methods are 
outlined. Then the findings and analysis are presented. These focus both on the 
processes of sensemaking that were employed in risk identification and the 
underlying assumptions and perspectives on which these processes were based. 
Finally, the theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.  
 
 
Airline safety incidents and risk analysis 
 
The analysis of flight safety incidents by investigators in airlines is a focused site of 
risk identification. Incident reporting systems are well established in the airline 
industry and are widely operated both by airlines and national regulatory agencies 
(O’Leary and Chappell, 1996; Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000). Airline personnel are 
obliged to report any event that may have implications for flight safety to an 
independent safety oversight unit in the airline—for instance, an equipment failure, 
a misheard instruction from Air Traffic Control, or an erroneous entry in a technical 
log. Investigators in these safety units review and analyze incident reports, and 
recommend and oversee any appropriate risk management action. While these 
incident reporting systems allow known risks to be monitored, they primarily 
represent an organizational strategy for capturing previously unknown and 
unexpected risks. Analyzing incidents allows safety investigators to identify risks 
that are not otherwise anticipated in the planning and design of operations, nor 
predicted in prospective risk assessments, nor captured in audit and assurance 
programmes. The analysis work of investigators is therefore heavily oriented to the 
identification of previously unrecognized, latent risks.  
 
The work of investigators follows a typical pattern. Once incident reports are 
submitted they are entered into an electronic information management system. 
Investigators process each new report by reviewing the brief details and summary 
provided, judging the risk it represents, assigning a risk rating, and determining 
what further investigation may be necessary. Reports are then passed to specialists 
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in relevant areas of the airline, with a request for an opinion or further technical 
information. Investigators coordinate and oversee these local investigations, which 
can remain active from a few days to several months, and may involve a single 
specialist or a large team. In a large airline some hundred or so investigations could 
be active and ongoing at any one time.  
 
Identifying latent risks by analyzing incident reports is challenging, and represents a 
typical situation faced by risk managers in many other organizational settings. 
Investigators are faced with large quantities of data; a team of four or five 
investigators in a large airline may deal with some 9,000 reported incidents a year. 
And, while the risks being managed are potentially catastrophic, the reported 
incidents relate to routine operational events that result in minor, and usually no, 
adverse consequences: where problems occurred but were effectively caught and 
contained. As such, the meaning for safety is often ambiguous—something went 
wrong but was corrected. Further, while incidents may be similar in general type—a 
communication problem or failure in a technical system—they are typically unique 
in their detail: what happened, what caused it, and how it was responded to and 
dealt with. What is more, the information received by investigators is minimal, and 
often of poor quality. Reports are brief, technical statements—usually “one-liners” 
to encourage reporting in the first place—and often concern events that reporters 
only partially observed or understood. Any event that may be of significance 
therefore needs to be followed up and investigated further.  
 
In light of all this, flight safety investigators work in an environment rich in weak 
signals, ambiguous signs, and possible warnings of potentially unknown risks. But 
while signs of potential problems are profligate, attention is limited. Investigators 
cannot follow up every incident reported to them. They must interpret incidents to 
identify what constitutes a risk, which issues to prioritize and pursue, and which to 
set aside.  
 
 
Sensemaking and risk in organizations 
 
Organizational sensemaking offers a broad framework within which to understand 
processes of interpretation and analysis in risk management. This framework draws 
on a long tradition of organizational and psychological theory, and distils from it a 
set of key premises. For Weick (1995, p. 14), “sensemaking begins with the basic 
question, is it still possible to take things for granted? And if the answer is no… 
then the question becomes, why is this so? And, what next?” In this influential 
characterization, sensemaking in organizations is occasioned by moments of 
uncertainty, anomaly, ambiguity, surprise and error (Weick, 1995; Starbuck and 
Milliken, 1988). These moments are the stuff of risk managers’ daily work (Hutter 
and Power, 2005).  
 
At the core of sensemaking is the ongoing interrelation of concrete cues to broader, 
more abstract, frames of reference. People bracket and extract specific features of 
events—such as the location of the damage caused to an aircraft, or the type of bird 
that struck it—and relate these to socially available knowledge and frames of 
reference such as rules, stories, norms or models regarding, for instance, previous 
bird strikes and their operational implications. Through this active interrelating of 
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cue and frame, people make sense. They build a plausible account or representation 
of a situation that can guide and explain action (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 
2005). Action is central to sensemaking. A key premise here is that people shape 
and enact the environment they face by acting in and on it (Weick, 1979). 
Suspecting a problem, people may investigate further, generating more information 
that changes their view of the problem they face. And sensemaking is guided by 
peoples’ understandings of their goals and identities: their views of what role is 
being performed, what projects are currently in progress, what objectives and ideals 
are being strived for. All of this is inherently social (Maitlis, 2005). Sense and 
organization are produced through social communication and interaction (Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005), and even when working alone, the frames of 
reference people draw upon are social products (Berger and Luckman, 1966).  
 
In the literature, facets of sensemaking connect most clearly with risk management 
at two extremes: disaster and success. On the dark side, a range of theories have 
sought to explain how risks remain hidden and unknown in organizations, and why 
signs of these risks go unnoticed or are misunderstood for long periods. Turner 
(1976; 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997) argued that accidents are preceded by a 
gradual accumulation of events that are at odds with currently accepted models and 
beliefs within an organization. This results from a failure to reconsider basic 
organizational assumptions and beliefs in light of disconfirming events. Simply put, 
these interpretive failures represent “the management system losing touch with its 
operational realities” (Turner, 1994, p. 216). Similarly, Vaughan (1990; 1996) has 
shown how weak signals of anomalies and deviance can quickly become 
normalized in organizations, through a process in which anomalies become 
redefined as expected standards of acceptable performance.  
 
On the brighter side, research has sought to explain how high-reliability 
organizations manage to rapidly identify and resolve emerging problems to 
maintain near failure-free operations. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) argue that this is 
achieved through a distinct approach to organizing that is activated by moments of 
surprise. Operational anomaly are noticed by personnel who are highly attentive to 
unexpected deviations and disruptions, and who flexibly organize around these 
events so as to “enlarge what is known about what was noticed” (Weick, Sutcliffe 
and Obstfeld, 1999, p. 91), revise flawed expectations, and solve problems while 
they are still small. Disrupted expectations act as triggers around which personnel 
interact to interpret and resolve unforeseen problems (Rochlin, 1989).  
 
At the core of both of these bodies of research is how ignorance and the unknown 
are handled—or mishandled—in organizations (Smithson, 1989; 1990). Accidents 
have been used to study the creation and inadvertent persistence of pockets of 
ignorance in organizations. Studies of organizational high-reliability have explored 
how early signs of the unexpected and surprising are responded to and explored. 
What these literatures do not address in any detail, however, are the processes of 
sensemaking that lead to risks being recognized and identified in the first place. 
Neither has research on sensemaking directly engaged with issues of ignorance and 
the unknown in organizations. Sensemaking is implicitly assumed to follow 
disruption or surprise. The interpretive work involved in the initial recognition and 
construction of these moments of disruption has remained largely invisible.  
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Research approach and methods 
 
This research aimed to examine the processes of sensemaking employed in the early 
identification of risks, and the underlying cultural assumptions and premises that 
support these processes. The focus was on risk managers’ own beliefs and 
understandings of risk, and the interpretive and analytical work they engage in to 
produce these. To study these aspects of risk management a qualitative, 
ethnographic approach was adopted. The work of risk managers was studied up 
close in its practical organizational setting, through repeated rounds of in-depth 
interviews and detailed participant observation. This approach aimed for theory 
elaboration (Lee, 1999): developing an explanatory account of practice that draws 
on, contributes to and extends current theory in this area. A constant comparative 
analytical approach was employed, following the principles of grounded theory 
(Glaser and Straus, 1967; Turner, 1983; Pidgeon and Henwood, 2003). This 
provides a systematic process for generating theoretical constructs from qualitative 
data, is particularly well suited to studying organizational sensemaking (Weick, 
1995; Locke, 2001), and has been effectively used in previous studies of 
organizational risk (Turner, 1976; Snook, 2000).  
 
 
Setting and participants 
 
The research was primarily conducted in the safety oversight department of a large 
UK airline. This airline operated a well-established incident reporting programme 
that, at the time of study, received around 9,000 flight safety reports a year. The 
work of ten safety investigators was studied, three of whom also had senior 
management responsibilities in the department. These investigators were 
responsible for the management of the flight safety incident reporting system. They 
all had lengthy experience in operational roles—as pilots, flight engineers, 
engineers and cabin crew—along with considerable experience of safety oversight, 
ranging between two and twenty years. An additional sixteen investigators were 
interviewed at six other organizations that operated similar flight safety reporting 
systems. These organizations differed in size and function. This provided the basis 
for further comparative refinement of the emerging findings. They included two 
small airlines, a medium sized airline, a large international airline and two national 
air safety agencies.  
 
 
Methods and procedures 
 
Qualitative data were collected over three years using a multi-method approach. 38 
interviews were conducted with investigators, along with some 400 hours of 
participant observation. The research progressed in six stages in line with an 
‘emergent’ research strategy (Lee, 1999): each stage developed on and was shaped 
by the findings of the last, as described below. Three rounds of interviews were 
conducted within the primary airline, followed by three months of participant 
observation there. Interviews were then conducted at the six comparative 
organizations, followed by a final round of interviews back at the primary airline.  
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Interviews 
First, five unstructured familiarization interviews were conducted to gain an initial 
view of investigators’ analytical work. Having found that participants drew on 
lengthy experience and professional judgment, the second stage of seven semi-
structured interviews explored this further by having each investigator talk through 
their analysis of a set of ten incidents, following Klein’s (Klein, Calderwood and 
Macgregor, 1989) critical decision method. The third stage consisted of nine semi-
structured interviews to review and further explore the emerging findings. The 
fourth stage of sixteen comparative interviews in the six other organizations 
examined both specific analytical practices and the issues highlighted previously. 
The final stage of interviews at the principle airline took the form of two 
unstructured conversational group interviews with eight investigators to review the 
key findings.  
 
Participant observation 
The participant observation study involved three months of close examination of 
the practical work of risk analysis in the principle airline. This study examined how 
investigators used and applied notions of risk in their daily work, and the analytical 
practices employed to identify risk. My place in the field ensured only peripheral 
involvement in these work activities, which Robson (2002) calls ‘marginal’ 
participation. I sat with investigators as they assessed 464 incident reports, asking 
them to account for their reasoning in each case. I also discussed with them the 
weekly incident reviews they produced, observed ongoing discussions and 
conversation, sat in on fortnightly team meetings, and observed three high-level 
board safety and operational review meetings. Ethnographic field notes were taken 
overtly and by hand, near-verbatim when required, following Emerson, Fretz and 
Shaw’s (1995) strategies, and later typed up. 
 
Analysis 
Data analysis was ongoing throughout the research, beginning immediately after the 
first interview phase. The aim was to gradually move from particular instances and 
examples of practice to more general theoretical categories and explanations. Initial 
coding was applied to the transcript and field note data from each study phase: all 
instances relevant to understanding how risks were being analyzed in practice were 
highlighted and labelled. These labels aimed to capture, in clear terms, what was 
going on in that particular instance. They captured, for example, where an 
investigator recalled some feature of a past accident when reviewing a present 
incident. So, these labels were low-level categories that captured aspects of 
sensemaking around risk.  
 
Data analysis cycled from this initial coding to phases of core coding. Here, the 
emphasis shifted to comparing, integrating and synthesizing these labels into 
higher-level categories, writing definitions for these categories, and mapping how 
these categories interrelated and connected with each other. For instance, referring 
to a past accident became part of a broader category concerning the use of general 
exemplars of risk. And this category was linked to others relating to the social 
sources of these risk exemplars. Iterative phases of this integration, comparison, and 
re-coding allowed key characteristics and patterns of sensemaking to be described 
and explained in terms heavily grounded in examples of practice. The analysis was 
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brought to a close once a coherent, sensible and fully elaborated account of the 
analysis work of investigators was produced.  
 
Identifying risks: making sense of organizational ignorance 
 
The risk oversight and analysis work of flight safety investigators was shaped by a 
distinct analytical culture. At core, this analytical culture was defined by a deep 
appreciation of the limits to organizational knowledge. Investigators assumed that 
their knowledge of risk was always partial and incomplete, and that the incident 
data available was inherently fallible and flawed. Risk assessment was viewed as a 
means of identifying areas of organizational activity that needed to be re-examined, 
reviewed and perhaps reshaped. That is, assessments of risk were used to label 
areas of organizational ignorance: where unknown, latent risks may potentially 
exist. So, to identify risks, investigators engaged in processes of sensemaking that 
were directed at creating and enlarging small moments of doubt: a belief that 
current models of organizational activity were in some way questionable or suspect. 
These doubts were constructed through four distinct patterns of sensemaking. 
  
 
An analytical culture of interpretive vigilance 
 
Investigators shared a set of assumptions, values and beliefs regarding their role and 
organizational position as risk managers, the nature of the organizational data being 
dealt with, and the organizational function and purpose of risk assessment. These 
shared premises formed a distinct analytical culture that was centred on a deeply 
ambivalent relationship with ignorance. One of the most fundamental assumptions 
of investigators was that their knowledge of organizational activity, and its 
associated risks, was always partial and incomplete. This assumption was 
continually reinforced by their ongoing experience of investigating and managing 
risks. This in turn shaped how they understood their role as risk managers and the 
purpose of risk assessment.  
 
Organizational ignorance was believed to arise from a number sources, and threaten 
the process of risk management in a number of ways. First, organizational 
complexity and change were assumed to be sources of fundamental limits to 
investigators’ knowledge. Investigators believed that the sheer complexity of airline 
operations precluded complete and comprehensive knowledge of all possible 
problems. They also believed that changes in organizational arrangements and the 
broader industry continually rendered their knowledge invalid and out of date: 
It happens all the time—who supplies the de-icing fluid, who does the de-icing? 
Things that you take for granted all of a sudden change. 
In their experience, countless investigations and accidents had proven this to be the 
case.  
 
Second, investigators were particularly aware of the limitations to the incident data 
they depended on, and the flaws and influences it was open to. Primarily, they were 
concerned about not getting information at all. A ‘quiet’ week with relatively few 
incidents reported suggested they were simply not hearing about problems, rather 
than there being none. Equally, investigators assumed that the incidents reported to 
them were only a partial sample of those actually occurring—the “tip of the 
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iceberg”. Further, the content and accuracy of the reports were considered 
questionable as they were written from the limited perspective of a single observer:  
Where we fail is getting information early enough… Even sometimes from the 
individual [reports], it doesn’t come out. You will get the report saying we had a fire 
warning in the cargo bay. Then you find out that it happened outside the cargo bay 
but the detectors inside detected it. Then you think this is serious, because we have a 
process to protect fires in the cargo bay—fireproofing and extinguishers. But this is 
outside, so you have a problem there, and the process escalates and you realize how 
much more important it is as you get more information. So the end result, [is that] we 
get the information, but it is very difficult to get that information early on. 
Incident data were viewed as inherently inaccurate—and often entirely wrong. A 
stark poster to this effect hung in one of their offices.  
 
Third, investigators assumed that their own analyses and assessments could easily 
be flawed. They viewed assessments of risk as a fallible product of their current 
knowledge, the information available and their ability to piece this together 
effectively. Investigators believed that risk assessments were “only as good as the 
people doing the analysis”, and that this analysis could easily be performed 
poorly—missing important points, dismissing relevant information or 
misconstruing evidence.  
 
This broad concern with the limits of knowledge, information and analysis was 
based on investigators’ ongoing experience of risk management. They cited 
countless examples of interpretive failures—where beliefs, data and assessments 
had been proven incomplete or entirely wrong, often by some adverse event. Major 
accidents were seen as the most vivid and incontrovertible evidence of this, 
demonstrating where risks had not been foreseen or fully understood:  
We always thought [this event] was back here in the chain… We didn’t think that 
this would happen first, that would break down, and then that can happen. But if we 
could do that we would all be geniuses, and the thing with accidents is that they 
prove that we are not geniuses. They are where we have got it wrong and we need to 
learn.  
 
Equally, investigators believed that the daily work of reviewing and investigating 
incidents continually revealed where they had previously been unaware of risks. 
Stories of how people had been caught out in the past, and missed signs of 
impending disaster, were commonly told. For instance, discussing an incident in 
which an engineer had misdiagnosed the cause of a fault, two investigators retold a 
story of an infamous accident that another airline had suffered several years ago, 
where part of the top of the aircraft ripped off during flight with the loss of a flight 
attendant: 
First investigator: It was loads of human factors that went into that. I was over in 
engineering then, and the millions that were spent on looking into that, looking at all 
this non-destructive testing to find cracks… But a guy who knew all about it 
reckoned the crack had to be like that [demonstrating several millimetres wide and 
several centimetres long]. It was up by the door, left number one, upper right side. 
You don’t need tools to see that.  
Second investigator: Just a mark one eyeball… And it was on a real high cycle 
aircraft, it should have been one of their basic checks, they were a really high risk 
group.  
Researcher: With all the island hopping? 
Second investigator: That’s it. Up and down, up and down, it’s like a test, expanding 
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and contracting it all the time… So they should have been checking it, and when 
they looked there was a history of pressurization problems, leaky seals and things.  
First investigator: And one of the passengers reported seeing the crack, either on that 
flight or on one before.  
Second investigator: And there would have been sounds, but being close to the door 
people would just have said, yup, it’s the door—leaky seal, that explains it. 
First investigator: That’s right, if it had been right between the two doors people 
might have paid a little more attention to it. That’s a good point, I like that.  
 
Interpretive failure, missed warnings, and ignored or unrecognized signs of risk 
were a central preoccupation of investigators and defined this culture of analysis. 
Investigators viewed their risk management role as one of maintaining a high 
degree of sensitivity and attentiveness to weak signs of potential risks. Their 
relationship to organizational ignorance was therefore deeply ambivalent. While 
there was an expectation and acceptance that knowledge was inevitably limited in 
some way, there was also a strong belief that moments of surprise—of being caught 
out by events—were moments of failure. For investigators, to be surprised was to 
have failed, implying they had allowed a prolonged and considerable disjuncture to 
develop between their understanding of the organization and actual events: 
When we trip over it, that’s where the intolerable occurs… it means that our systems 
not only have fallen down, but it has obviously been wrong for a long period of time. 
So if something comes up like that, that is intolerable. It means we have been 
derelict. 
Another typical comment was: 
You’ve not done your job by flagging this back earlier… if you get something that 
warrants action and soon, it surprises you. Horrify might be a better word.  
 
Accordingly, the primary aim of investigators was to remain informed and aware of 
the risks facing operations. They viewed the purpose of their analytical work as 
identifying where their current understanding of organizational activities may be 
outdated, incomplete or wrong, and using this as a basis for learning and advancing 
organizational knowledge of risks:  
You couldn’t look at last year’s data and say, that was how the risk was scored then, 
that was how it’s scored now, so there is an inconsistency. There isn’t, because your 
knowledge has moved—and hopefully expanded. 
As such, the purpose of risk assessment was seen as a process of identifying gaps or 
inconsistencies in their knowledge of risk, “to recognize where your problems are”, 
and to label these for further attention and investigation. Investigators used 
assessments of risk to direct and focus organizational attention onto previously 
taken-for-granted aspects of operations, to “get people thinking”, to “prompt 
discussion” and to “spark action”. Risk assessments were used to indicate that some 
aspect of organizational activity required re-examining and perhaps redesigning. 
Determining that an incident represented a risk was a way of signalling and 
prioritizing the need for renewed sensemaking within the organization. 
 
This approach to risk analysis, and the assumptions and beliefs that underpinned it, 
can be characterized as a culture of interpretive vigilance. Based on their 
assumptions about organizational ignorance and their role as risk managers, 
investigators aspired to a high level of sensitivity to weak signs of potential 
problems. They sought to remain vigilantly attentive to the early signals of 
emerging risks, in the form of gaps and inconsistencies in their own knowledge. 
Moreover, they attempted to approach incident data—and their own interpretations 
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of risk—with a high degree of scepticism, humility and caution. Investigators were 
constantly concerned with where they may have “got things wrong”, how they may 
be “deluding themselves” and that they “could easily fool ourselves”. In practice, 
this wariness and unease translated into distinctive patterns of sensemaking around 
incidents, through which investigators attempted to find where their current beliefs 
and knowledge were questionable or open to doubt. 
 
 
Ways of identifying risk: constructing and enlarging doubt 
 
Investigators identified risks by focusing on and enlarging small moments of doubt: 
a sense that current knowledge of organizational activity was in some way 
questionable or suspect. Doubts were fleeting signs of organizational ignorance—a 
space where the organization was poorly understood and latent risks may be hidden. 
These moments of doubt emerged when incidents could be construed as challenging 
or problematic in terms of currently accepted beliefs and models of operational 
safety.  
 
For the most part, incidents were considered unremarkable. Many events were 
considered to be “all part of normal operations” and were not dwelt on. They were 
deemed well-understood and dealt with relatively automatically:  
Most of [the incidents], you know enough to just fly through. [You] check and can 
say okay, it is not a problem… you’re just flying through and they are standard. But 
as soon as you get into the contentious ones, you start talking about it. 
The incidents that attracted the attention of investigators were those that in some 
way disturbed or unsettled their view that all was adequately understood and under 
control in an area of the organization. These were events that were “contentious” or 
“troubling” in some way, and so provoked closer examination and investigation.  
 
Incidents were interpreted as contentious or troubling through four interrelated 
patterns of sensemaking. These four patterns of sensemaking were the processes 
through which weak signs of potential risk were recognized and pieced together. 
They involved: 
• making connections, between features of an incident and past accidents or 
major risk issues; 
• identifying patterns of failure, where incidents appeared to share some 
underlying common factor; 
• sensing discrepancy, where there appeared to be inconsistencies in 
organizational activities or their knowledge of them; and 
• noticing novelty, where aspects of an event had not been seen before. 
 
Broadly, the first two sensemaking processes were based on judgments of 
similarity—constructing patterns, making relations and matching like with like (e.g. 
Weick, 1995). The second two processes were based on judgments of difference—
finding gaps, disjunctions and dissimilarity (e.g. Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). These 
processes were highly interrelated, triggering one another. For instance, once a 
pattern of failure had been constructed it may become categorized as a widespread 
issue, leading to connections being drawn between that issue and other more 
disparate and diverse events. Or, noticing a novel or apparently new form of failure 
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could provoke a review of past events, revealing a previously unidentified pattern. 
Each of these sensemaking processes are examined in turn.  
 
Drawing connections 
Seeing a connection, no matter how weak, between an incident and a broader safety 
issue or past major accident led investigators to doubt safety in the operational area 
concerned. Past accidents and broader safety issues—such as industry-wide 
problems identified by safety agencies, or ongoing safety investigations—provided 
frames of reference that investigators used to interpret incidents with otherwise 
minor or inconsequential outcomes. References to past accidents while assessing 
incidents were profligate. An incident could be “like Taipei”, or was “Tenerife all 
over again”, or “stinks of Milan”—all references to past major air accidents. These 
connections were made on the basis of any perceived similarity between features of 
the incident and factors implicated in the accident or broader concern.  
 
For instance, in one incident a crew reported that nearly the full length of the 
runway was used on landing. It had been raining and, as a result of being distracted 
by a suspected failure of one set of windscreen wipers, the autothrottle had been 
inadvertently left engaged. The investigator immediately deemed this “a bit of a 
QF1”—referring to the flight code of another airline’s aircraft that had overrun a 
runway in a heavy rain storm due, amongst other things, to a distracted crew—and 
flagged it for closer examination. 
 
Relating incidents such as this to the broader frame provided by a past major event 
led investigators to question aspects of operations more broadly, and more 
seriously, than the incidents on their own would have justified. Connecting an event 
of limited or no consequences with a past accident or major issue was one way that 
investigators enlarged their concerns beyond the immediate incident reported—
even though these connections were acknowledged to be “tenuous links”. Tenuous 
though they were, drawing these connections was a key basis for identifying where 
the safety of organizational activities was open to doubt. It was a process for 
creating and enlarging areas of ignorance. 
  
Making patterns 
Investigators doubted the safety of operations if they could make some sort of 
pattern that related reported incidents. Such patterns suggested a common, 
underlying problem of which they were currently unaware. Patterns were 
occasionally easy to make, particularly the repeated occurrence of similar events. 
Such repetition was taken as a strong indication of a problem, and brought the 
adequacy of risk management processes in that area into doubt. “Repeaters” clearly 
demonstrated to investigators that risk management in the area had not adequately 
addressed the issue.  
 
However, patterns were not always so easy to make. In many cases, investigators 
had to more creatively piece together possible relationships between incidents. For 
instance, investigators received a report describing how a crew had been slow to 
disconnect the autothrottle during cruise, resulting in a relatively insignificant eight 
knot speed exceedence for the flap setting they were on. The investigator reviewing 
this incident felt that it was similar to three other recent events that were, 
superficially at least, entirely different—one where a crew had slightly rolled over a 
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stop line that lead onto a live runway, another where a crew had briefly forgotten to 
change the altimeter mode after take-off, and a third where a crew belatedly 
realized they had been flying a manoeuvre too slowly for the flap setting. These 
were all interpreted as “distraction-type ones”, leading the investigator to question, 
“is it part of a big picture, are we building up a risk?”  
 
The underlying links that investigators made between apparently diverse incidents 
were often subtle. Whether an event seemed to be part of a ‘bigger picture’ was 
rarely self-evident in the reports themselves. The patterns made were based on 
small numbers of events. Investigators were liberal with the terms ‘trend’ and 
‘spate’, because they wanted to find and fix problems early. Two events could make 
a trend, three or four a spate. Here, creating a doubt depended on investigators 
actively building the big picture they suspected it might then fit into. Making 
patterns—and so identifying risks—was therefore an interpretive rather than a 
statistical exercise.  
 
Sensing discrepancy 
Investigators suspected that their organizational knowledge may be inadequate 
when they identified any apparent inconsistency in organizational processes, or 
their understanding of them—where things didn’t seem to properly match up or fit 
together. Sometimes these discrepancies were clear. Other times they were more 
subtle, “little niggling things” where it seemed that “something’s not quite right” 
but it wasn’t clear exactly what. A simple example, for instance, concerned a report 
that described an apparent mismatch between the ECAM (Electronic Centralised 
Aircraft Monitoring) warning drill and the MEL (Mandatory Equipment List) 
procedures for dealing with a fuel pump pressure warning prior to take-off:  
Anytime we see a disagreement between ECAM and MEL it’s very worrying, as the 
manufacturers write both. And generally the crew follow the ECAM. So we 
definitely need to understand this.  
 
Such discrepancies worried investigators, and signalled an area that they needed to 
understand. More subtly, investigators became suspicious when they perceived any 
slight discrepancy between what they would have expected to happen and what was 
reported in incidents (e.g. Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). On one occasion, for 
instance, an investigator reviewed an incident in which a take-off had been aborted 
at low speed due to an engine overspeed warning—signalling that one of the 
compressor fans in the engine was spinning too fast, reducing thrust. The flight 
crew were advised by engineering control to check the engine with two stationary 
engine runs and, as those were clear, to depart as planned. While this sequence was 
a typical one, the investigator was unsure about the advice given to the flight crew. 
He was not entirely certain, but “thought they would have done other checks before 
restarting” with this type of warning. Having “a dig around” and making some 
telephone calls, he found out that the powerplant engineers “weren’t happy” either, 
and believed that further maintenance checks may have been appropriate before the 
aircraft was dispatched. Picking up on small discrepancies between the way 
investigators believed things should be and the way they occurred in incidents was 
one way in which they produced and enlarged small moments of doubt to identify 
underlying risks.  
 
 
 14 
Perceiving novelty 
Investigators developed doubts about the adequacy of operational knowledge if an 
event was perceived to suggest some new or previously unrecognized facet of 
failure. Recognizing new ways that organizational activity might break down was a 
simple and direct indicator of potential ignorance. It involved perceiving signs of 
new and previously unheard of forms of organizational weakness—either by seeing 
new forms of failure, or by seeing new implications of known failures, such as 
novel ways that they might occur and develop.  
It could be either a new kind of condition or a condition you have had for a while, 
but you will suddenly see it as a major link in a chain… a new link in a chain that 
gives us an unease.  
 
Signs of novelty were typically both subtle and specific, relating to some slightly 
different or new facet of operational failure. One example concerned incidents of 
momentary ‘sticking’ or stiffness of flight controls once cruise altitude had been 
reached. On investigation this turned out to have resulted from de-icing fluid 
dehydrating and accumulating in crevices of the aircraft, re-hydrating on warm, 
humid days and then freezing at high altitude—later discovered to be an industry-
wide problem (Wastnage, 2005).  
 
Recognizing novelty was a clear way of exposing the limits of current knowledge. 
Where making patterns, drawing connections and sensing discrepancy involved 
relating incidents to some broader frame or bigger picture, perceiving novelty 
involved identifying where there was no picture. Signs of novelty signalled to 
investigators a pressing gap in organizational knowledge that needed to be 
addressed. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research aimed to investigate and characterize the early sensemaking processes 
involved in the identification of organizational risks. A key challenge in risk 
analysis is recognizing and perceiving signs of previously unknown, latent or taken 
for granted organizational conditions (Reason, 1997; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Examining the interpretive processes that underlie practices of risk analysis in 
airline safety oversight suggests, perhaps counter intuitively, that risk identification 
involves the organizational production of ignorance. Identifying risks involved 
actively calling into question that which was currently taken for granted, and 
working to bring current beliefs and assumptions into doubt. In this sense, risk 
analysis routinized Weick’s (1995) organizational sensemaking recipe; is it still 
possible to take things for granted—and if not, why? In practice, risk identification 
was a process of interrogating and probing the limits of current knowledge by 
constructing and enlarging small moments of doubt. These doubts were produced 
through patterns of sensemaking that interrelated organizational incidents with 
broader frames of reference in ways that made weak signals meaningful, relevant 
and worthy of further attention. 
 
These findings hold three implications for theory, practice and future research. 
First, this research demonstrates the importance of the knowledge, beliefs and 
frames of reference that are used in risk analysis. How knowledge is drawn on and 
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related to new information is as important in risk analysis as the data available. This 
knowledge can take a variety of forms. Here, detailed practical knowledge of 
organizational processes and goals, previous problems and past accidents was of 
particular importance. This was particularly the case given that the information 
available to investigators early on was so limited, ambiguous and imprecise—as 
can be reasonably expected in many other risk management situations. Identifying 
risks early and as soon as possible was therefore an interpretive rather than a 
statistical exercise, and a range of interpretive tactics and sensemaking processes 
supported this. One implication for practice is therefore that the importance of these 
broader frames of knowledge—that are often developed and shared through stories 
about past accidents and events (e.g. Orr, 1996; Weick, 1987)—should be 
acknowledged, and their use more explicitly encouraged and developed in risk 
management.  
 
Second, the research suggests the importance of ignorance in risk analysis, and 
elaborates some of the ways that ignorance is produced and used. Risk 
identification was a process of recognizing where current organizational knowledge 
may be limited or inadequate. Small moments of doubt were used to identify areas 
of ignorance, where current knowledge of the organization needed to be reviewed, 
developed or remade. In practice, drawing connections, making patterns, sensing 
discrepancies and noticing novelty all provided ways of interrogating the unknown 
(Wildavsky, 1988), exposing the limits of assumptions (Turner, 1978; Turner and 
Pidgeon, 1997) and violating expectations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Investigators engaged in these processes of sensemaking to tackle ignorance before 
it tackled them. These findings also emphasize the variety of forms that ignorance 
can take in organizations (e.g. Smithson, 1989; Weick, 1998b), beyond traditional 
concepts of probabilistic uncertainty. Another implication for practice is therefore 
the importance of acknowledging this, and establishing analytical cultures in which 
scepticism, doubts, suspicions and queries can be voiced and are acted upon.  
 
Third, this research holds a range of implications for future work in this area. The 
analysis demonstrates that the theoretical framework of organizational 
sensemaking, and an ethnographic and grounded research methodology, provide 
suitable approaches to studying the early stages of risk analysis. Clear patterns of 
sensemaking were identified, along with the cultural premises that support these in 
this specific organizational setting. The particular setting studied here is, of course, 
relatively unique in terms of the experts and technology involved, the risks 
managed and the specific tasks conducted. However, the risk analysis challenges 
faced here—in terms of poor quality initial information, organizational data on 
mainly routine and minor failures, and weak signs of large numbers of potential 
problems—are relatively common across a wide range of organizational risk 
management settings (Vaughan, 1996; Reason, 1997; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). 
Moreover, in this research approach, generalizability is aimed for in terms of the 
applicability and explanatory power of the conceptual account that is developed. 
The cultural premises of ignorance that underlie risk management practice, the use 
of doubts and suspicions as early indicators of potential risk, and the distinct 
patterns of sensemaking conceptualized here may offer useful theoretical tools that 
allow us to better understand how risk managers identify previously unknown 
threats in a range of organizational and regulatory settings. 
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